

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 129766

62

ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00

NSC-05 BIB-01 /089 R

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PM/DCA:VBAKER S/S-JMEALUM

INR/PMT:RBARAZ

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DOD/JCS:RMCCANN

NSC:MHIGGINS

C:WSHINN ACDA/THIRSCHFELD

EUR/CS:GHUMPHREY(SUBS)

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P R 032342Z JUN 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT:MBFR: FRG VIEWS ON VERIFICATION

REF: A. STATE 119270, B. STATE 109061, C. BONN 8395,

D. STATE 126897

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 129766

1. FOLLOWING ARE SPECIFIC REPLIES TO GRUENDEL QUESTIONS AS REPORTED IN REFTEL C.

2. WESTERN ENTRY/EXIT POINTS: WE HAVE NO SPECIFIC LIST OF ENTRY/EXIT POINTS ON WESTERN SIDE OF NGA. OUR SUGGESTION OF SIX OR EIGHT POINTS IS MERELY AN ESTIMATE OF WHAT SHOULD COVER POINTS OF ENTRY AND EXIT MOST FREQUENTLY USED BY US TROOPS AND EQUIPMENT, PLUS POSSIBLE ADDITIONAL POINTS WHICH INDIVIDUALS AND SMALL GROUPS MIGHT BE ALLOWED TO USE WITHOUT REQUIRING SPECIAL PERMISSION (E.G., KEHL AND AMSTERDAM). INCLUDED IN THESE ADDITIONAL POINTS WOULD BE LOCATIONS OUTSIDE THE FRG TO AVOID SINGLING OUT FRG TERRITORY. WE INTEND TO REMAIN FLEXIBLE CONCERNING EXACT NUMBER BECAUSE WE CANNOT ACCURATELY ESTIMATE NUMBER SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO REQUIRE AND BECAUSE WE DO NOT KNOW YET WHETHER MANNED POSTS WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT THESE POINTS. ALSO, WE ARE CONSIDERING PERMITTING EACH SIDE TO DECLARE ITS OWN POINTS. THUS, EACH SIDE COULD WEIGH ITS OWN TRADE OFFS BETWEEN DECLARING MORE

POINTS WITH MORE OBSERVERS OR NAMING FEWER POINTS WITH FEWER OBSERVERS.

3. CHALLENGE INSPECTION: WE CONSIDERED THE IDEA OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION IN OUR TECHNICAL EVALUATION BUT BELIEVE IT WOULD BE UNDESIRABLE FOR SEVERAL REASONS. WHETHER PERFORMED BY AIR OR GROUND MOBILE TEAMS, IT WOULD REQUIRE PRESENTING ADVANCE JUSTIFICATION TO THE OPPOSITE SIDE. DISPUTES AND DELAYS WOULD BE INEVITABLE, THUS NULLIFYING ITS VALUE AS AN INSPECTION MEASURE. IT WOULD ALSO ENABLE EAST TO USE CHALLENGES TO HARASS US ON OUR SIDE OF NGA. FURTHERMORE, EAST COULD DELIBERATELY CREATE FALSE SITUATIONS TO PROVOKE UNPRODUCTIVE WESTERN CHALLENGES AND THUS DEBASE THE CONCEPT IN THE EYES OF WESTERN PARLIAMENTS AND PUBLICS. FINALLY, CHALLENGE INSPECTION WOULD ENABLE EAST TO PROBE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF WESTERN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION BY CREATING CONTROLLED SITUATIONS AND SEEING WHETHER WE CHALLENGE.

4. RATHER THAN PROPOSE CHALLENGE INSPECTION, WE SUGGESTED THE ANALOGOUS CONCEPT OF A QUOTA OF AUTOMATIC INSPECTIONS.

SECRET

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PAGE 03 STATE 129766

ALTHOUGH THIS PRESENTS THE ALLIANCE WITH THE PROBLEM OF MANAGING ITS QUOTA, IT DOES AVOID THE PROBLEM OF JUSTIFYING A CHALLENGE. UNDER THIS SYSTEM, SHOULD THE EAST DELAY OR DISPUTE THE INSPECTION, IT WOULD TEND TO HEIGHTEN SUSPICION OF THEIR MOTIVES AMONG WESTERN GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLICS MORE THAN IN THE CASE OF CHALLENGE INSPECTION.

5. WE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE PLEASED TO DISCUSS THE ISSUE

WITH FRG EXPERTS.

6. GIVEN VERY HELPFUL COMMENTS BY ROTH (REFTEL B) AND IN VIEW OF ADDITIONAL FRG CLARIFICATIONS GIVEN TO US BY FRG EMBASSY HERE (SEE REF D), EMBASSY BONN SHOULD INFORM GRUENDEL OR ROTH, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT WE NOW HOPE THAT SUFFICIENT CONSENSUS EXISTS WITHIN NATO TO WARRANT NEW AND MORE SPECIFIC VERIFICATION PRESENTATION TO THE EAST IN VIENNA DURING THE PRESENT SESSION (WE ASSUME PARA 2F, REFTEL D, DOES NOT PRECLUDE PLENARY STATEMENT THIS SESSION PROVIDED THE SUBSTANCE OF ONE CAN BE AGREED IN NATO). WE EXPECT TO BE ABLE TO GIVE FRG OUR IDEAS SOON ON HOW BEST TO PROCEED WITH ALLIANCE TREATMENT OF THIS MATTER. INGERSOLL

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